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TITLE VII: LEGAL PROTECTION AGAINST SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
by
ARTHUR J. MARINELLI, JR.*
Sexual harassment has been broadly defined as "the unwanted imposition
of sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of unequal power."' The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has issued guidelines
which state that "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature" may constitute sexual
harassment.2 While sexual harassment may be directed at either sex, this arti-
cle will focus on the far more pervasive harassment of females by males.3
Sexual harassment is one of the most significant labor issues of the 1980's.
The cost to both employers and employees is great" and the incidence of sexual
harassment is quite pervasive. A study at Harvard revealed that 34% of female
undergraduates, 41% of female graduate students and 49% of nontenured
women faculty experienced sexual harassment.' It can be expected that the
number of cases brought by women and men will greatly increase since sexual
harassment "occurs across the lines of age, marital status, physical appearance,
race, class, occupation, pay range, and any other factor that distinguishes
women from each other."'6
It has been estimated that a substantial proportion of men in the work
force, approximately 10 to 15 percent, complain of homosexual overtures or
sexual intimidation by female supervisors.7 A United States Civil Service
survey concluded that 42% of females suffered some form of sexual harass-
ment which in its more egregious forms broke down to 26%, deliberate
touching; 15%, pressure for dates; 9%, pressure for sexual favors; 9%, letters
and calls; and 1%, actual or attempted rape or assault! The overwhelming ma-
jority of respondents who had worked for nonfederal employers in the past
*Professor of Business Law, Ohio University.
'C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN. 1 (1979).
'Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1984).
'Sexual harassment in gender-based discrimination would not apply in cases where a bisexual supervisor sex-
ually harasses workers of both sexes or where the harassment is equally offensive to workers of both sexes
because both sexes were accorded like treatment. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11 th Cir.
1982).
'The Merit Systems Protection Board found that the costs to the federal government between May 1978 and
May 1980 is conservatively estimated to have been 180 million. The study found that 15.3% of the men
surveyed and 42% of the women had encountered some form of sexual harassment. 107 LAB. REL. REP.
(BNA) 3 (1981).
'Fair Harvard, Are You Fair?, Time 109 Nov. 14, 1983.
6C. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 28.
'See, e.g., U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: IS
IT A PROBLEM? 36 (1981) [hereinafter cited as U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS].
Id. at 6. 1
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reported that sexual harassment was no worse with the federal government
than with their other employers.9
While victims at one time suffered in silence, they now are inclined to
seek legal redress. In the first year after the EEOC promulgated its guidelines'O,
the EEOC received about 1,000 sexual harassment complaints and state and
local human rights agencies received twice that number." The first Supreme
Court case 2 recently decided and the resulting favorable publicity will un-
doubtedly bring a new wave of litigation.
The difficulty of determining what constitutes sexual harassment has
been written about extensively 3 and Professor MacKinnon clearly stated one
of the most basic problems as: "between the clear coercion and the clear mutu-
ality, exists a murky area where power and caring converge. Here arises some
of the most profound issues of sexual harassment, and those which the courts
are least suited to resolve."" Due to a lack of legislative guidance, the judiciary
must undertake to define a cause of action that affects the private realm of in-
terpersonal relationships. None of the extensive legislative history of Title VII
or its 1972 Amendments specifically pertain to sexual harassment. Further,
the amendment which added the word "sex" to the Civil Rights Act of 1964
was a last minute futile effort by Representative Smith of Virginia to defeat
passage of the bill by making it unacceptable. 5 The courts must define the
cause of action so as not to infringe upon the protected rights of privacy 6 and
the protections guaranteed by the Constitution for freedom of expression. 7
The law has changed a great deal since Professor Calvert Magruder
characterized the law:
Women have occasionally sought damages for mental distress and
humiliation on account of being addressed by a proposal of illicit inter-
course. This is peculiarly a situation where circumstances alter cases. If
'Id. at 39-40.
145 Fed. Reg. 74, 676 (1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1981)).
"Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND LABOR RELATIONS 6 (1981) (Interview of
EEOC Vice-Chairman Daniel Leach).
"Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
"E.g. Somer, Sexual Harassment in the Office, MANAGEMENT WORLD, 10-11 (1980).
'
4See C. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 54.
I 10 Cong. Rec. 2, 577-82 (1964).
"See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The important right of privacy must be balanced with
the right not to be victimized by offensive sexual harassment, Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 945 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
"See U.S. CONST. amend. I. In EEOC v. Sage Realty Co, 507 F. Supp. 599, 610 & n. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
the employer asserted that construing Title VII to ban revealing costumes designed for the employer and
coordinated with the Bicentennial violated his first amendment rights. The court rejected the argument
because the employer conceded that it had no "intention to express itself artistically." Id. It is clear that dress
is an area where employers must be concerned about sexual harassment suits under federal and state laws
and that customary practices of an industry will not be a defense to rebut a prima facie case of sex
discrimination. See Slayton v. Michigan Host, Inc. 376 N.W.2d 664, 669 (Mich. App. 1985).
[Vol. 20:3
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SEXUAL HARASSMENT
there has been no incidental assault and battery, or perhaps trespass to
land, recovery is generally denied, the view being, apparently, that there is
no harm in asking."
In November 1980, the EEOC placed freedom from sexual harassment
within its ambit by issuing guidelines defining actions which constitute viola-
tions of Title VII. According to Griggs v. Duke Power,9 the EEOC's ad-
ministrative interpretations of Title VII are entitled to great deference. The
strength of an EEOC decision lies in the force of its logic, not the force of its
authority."0 Recently the Supreme Court, in Meritor v. Vinson,2 has sustained
the EEOC guidelines providing that the "plaintiff may establish a violation of
Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or
abusive work environment."2
The purpose of this article is to examine early case law and recent court
decisions involving sexual harassment, especially Meritor v. Vinson. The arti-
cle will discuss employer avoidance of liability under the EEOC guidelines and
will urge employers to implement steps to investigate, prohibit, and sensitize
supervisors to sexual harassment.
EARLY CASE LAW UNDER TITLE VII
Examination of the early legal status of sexual harassment is useful in un-
derstanding the present legal issues concerning employer liability. Prior to the
issuance of the EEOC Guidelines in 1980 the legality or illegality of sexual ha-
rassment and employer liability rested entirely upon the courts interpretation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The initial district court decisions23
almost uniformly rejected sexual harassment as a cause of action under Title
VII because of fear of widespread and frivilous litigation. 4 These early cases
often cited a lack of employment relatedness and held the cause of action un-
connected to gender based discrimination. These early cases which rejected
"Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1055, (1936).
For examples of the law today see Attanasio, Equal Justice Under Chaos: The Developing Law of Sexual
Harassment, 51 U. CINN. L. REV. 1 (1982).
19401 U.S. 424 (1971).
0Id. at 433-34.
"
1Meritor, 106 S. Ct. at 2399.
nid. at 4706.
23See e.g. Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979);
Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.,
422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd 568 F.2d 1044 (3rd Cir. 1977).
'The District Court in Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elect. & Gas Co. warned that "if an inebriated approach by
a supervisor to a subordinate at the office Christmas party could form the basis of a federal lawsuit ... if a
promotion or a raise is later denied.., we would need 4,000 federal trial judges instead of some 400." 422 F.
Supp. 553, 557 (D.N.J. 1976). The court of appeals rejected this opening of a Pandora's Box of litigation
argument as a justification for dismissing the action. Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F. 2d
1044, 1049 (3rd Cir. 1977).
Winter, 19871
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sexual conduct as a basis for a cause of action ignored the fact that most sexu-
ality is gender-related. In Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.25 no liability was im-
posed because no employer policy was served by the supervisor's alleged con-
duct; no benefit to the employer was involved; and the supervisors alleged con-
duct had no relationship to the nature of employment. The early cases viewed
sexual harassment as a "personal" dispute and gave little weight to the employ-
ment context within which the sexual harassment took place. As one judge
suggested: "[A]n outgrowth of holding such activity to be actionable under Ti-
tle VII would be a potential federal lawsuit every time any employee made
amorous or sexually oriented advances toward another. The only sure way an
employer could avoid such charges would be to have employees who were
asexual."26
One year after the Come decision in 1976, the district court in Williams v.
Saxbe2" held sexual discrimination to be actionable. The court applied the
respondeat superior doctrine to sexual harassment by holding that if sex-based
discrimination was found to be the policy of a supervisor, then it was imputed
to be the policy of the employer.28 The court made it clear that an employer
was not liable for personal, isolated instances of sexual harassment29, nor did a
violation occur if a bisexual supervisor made advances to both genders." In
Heelan v. Johns-Manville CorpB", the District Court of Colorado agreed with
Williams that sexual harassment of females was gender-based discrimination
under Title VII. The Heelan court required a number of conditions to establish
a prima facie case, while taking note that Title VII does not provide relief for a
mere flirtation that has no substantial effect on employment. 2 The plaintiff
must plead and prove that employees of the opposite sex were not similarly af-
fected by the alleged harassment33, and that the sexual advances of a superior
were a term or condition of employment. 4
The appellate courts firmly rejected the notion that sexual harassment in
the workplace was not gender-related3" relying to a considerable extent on the
25Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated 362 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
"1d. at 163-64.
21413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'don other grounds, sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
2SId.
"Id. at 660-61.
"Id. at 659 n. 6.
"1451 F. Supp. 1382, 1388 (D. Colo. 1978).
3Id. at 1388-89.
33Id.
3Id. at 1388.
3"See, e.g., Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3rd Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Costle, 561
F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F. 2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Craig v. Y & Y Snacks,
Inc., 721 F.2d 77 (3rd Cir. 1983); Horn v. Duke Homes, Inc., Div. of Windsor Mobile Homes, 755 F.2d 599
(7th Cir. 1985).
[Vol. 20:3
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sex-plus cases in Phillips v. Martin-Marietta Corp.36 and Sprogis v. United Air
Lines, Inc." The sex-plus rationale prohibits use in the employment situation
of the stereotype of women as sex objects."
The analysis of the early sexual harassment case law reflects the disagree-
ment courts have had in relation to the extent of employer liability for the con-
duct of supervisors. The court in Williams imposed what is virtually strict
liability upon the employer for harassing conduct by a supervisor39, while the
court in Come held the employer not liable for acts unrelated to the
supervisor's functions.4° Early cases were also inconsistent as to the harm
which a victim of harassment must endure before a successful cause of action
can be brought. In Bundy v. Jackson4 a claim for a discriminatory atmosphere
was recognized while in Johns-Manville42 the court required concrete job
status harm. The lack of consistency of case law created chaos in litigation of
sexual harassment claims. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Meritor v.
Vinson affords some resolution of the inconsistencies. 3
RECENT CASE LAW: THE TITLE VII CAUSE OF ACTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964", as amended, requires the plain-
tiff to establish an "unlawful employment practice."45 Title VII defines an un-
lawful employment practice as an "employer... discriminat[ing] against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."' 1 The Act applies to employers engaged in an industry affecting com-
merce who have fifteen or more employees47 as well as employment agencies"
procuring employees for such an employer and to almost all labor organiza-
tions19 The 1972 amendments cover state and local governments, and agen-
cies.50
-400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).
37444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
381d.
"Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654,660 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'don other grounds; Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d
1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
"Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacatedon procedural grounds, 562
F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
641 F.2d 934, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
"1451 F. Supp. at 1390.
"3Meritor. 106 S. Ct. at 2399.
"42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982).
"Id.
*"d. (emphasis added).
"Id. § 2000e(b).
"Id. § 2000e(b), (c).
"id. § 2000e(c), (d).
-Id. § 2000e-16.
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Generally, sexual harassment cases will be brought under a disparate
treatment theory5' which occurs when an "employer simply treats some people
less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex or national
origin."52 In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green53 the Supreme Court held that
for a plaintiff to prove a prima facie case he must show:
(i) that he is a member of a [protected group]; (ii) that, he applied for, and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii)
that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his re-
jection the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications."
The McDonnell Douglas formulation applies to job status harms or
"economic" discrimination. While the case involved a hiring action, it has been
applied to promotion55 and termination cases.56 The McDonnell Douglas for-
mulation was designed to bring out the employer's intent in confidential and
complex personnel decisions and allows plaintiffs to infer discrimination by
focusing on their protected status and qualifications. In sex discrimination
cases, where manifest sexual impropriety is present some of the elements of
McDonnell Douglas should not be necessary. As the case itself recognized the
criteria are "not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual
situations."57 Under the McDonnell Douglas formulation, the plaintiff needs
only to allege a single incident of discrimination. 8 A plaintiff is not obligated to
prove a pattern or practice of discrimination. The severity of the discrimina-
tion is relevant to damages and not to liability.
The EEOC guidelines on sexual harassment (Guidelines)59 provide for
recognition of sexual harassment that involves the conditioning of employ-
ment benefits on sexual favors, which is often referred to as absolute or
economic sexual harassment, as well as harassment that creates a hostile or of-
fensive working environment.6 The Guidelines provide that in determining
whether there was a violation of Title VII the EEOC will examine "the record
"See C. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 193-206.
"International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977).
53411 U.S. 792 (1973).
4Id. at 802. In Bundy v. Jackson the court substituted the phrase "protected group" for the "racial minority"
found in McDonnell Douglas. 641 F.2d 934, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
"See Wright v. National Archives & Records Serv., 609 F.2d 702, 714 (4th Cir. 1979).
"Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979).
"411 U.S. at 802 n. 13.
'842 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976). Even if an employee is fired because of her sex based on a single incident dis-
crimination exists even where her employer has never fired another woman because of her sex. Doe v. Oste-
opathic Hospital of Wichita, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 1357, 1362 (D. Kan. 1971). Also the court held that proof of
a single act of discrimination was sufficient to state a claim of race discrimination in King v. Laborers Int'l
Union, 443 F. 2d 273, 278 (6th Cir. 1971).
5929 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1986).
"029 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1986).
[Vol. 20:3
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as a whole and the totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of the sex-
ual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred. The
determination ... will be made from the facts, on a case by case basis.'
The Supreme Court recently in Meritor v. Vinson firmly supported the
1980 EEOC Guidelines specifying that Title VII applies to a hostile or offen-
sive work environment and is not limited to "economic" or "tangible"
discrimination.62 The Supreme Court stressed that the phrase "terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment" evinces a congressional intent "to strike at
the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women" in employ-
ment.63 The Court emphasized that the Guidelines "while not controlling upon
the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance."' The Supreme Court quotes approvingly the Guideline language
that "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature"65 are prohibited conduct. Moreover the
Guidelines provide that such sexual misconduct constitutes prohibited "sexual
harassment," whether or not it is directly linked to the grant or denial of an
economic quid pro quo, where "such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
66
The Supreme Court held that Title VII "affords employees the right to
work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
insult. ' 67 The Court cited cases involving harassment, involving race" ,
religion 69 and natural origin70 to illustrate that hostile environment cases have
received judicial recognition as Title VII violations. The Supreme Court
stated: "Nothing in Title VII suggests that a hostile environment based on
discriminatory sexual harassment should not be likewise prohibited. The
guidelines thus appropriately drew from, and were fully consistent with ex-
isting case law." 7'
"i29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1986).
"106 S. Ct. at 2399.
"Id. quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707, n. 13 (1978), quoting in
turn Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc. 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971).
"Quoting General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-142 (1976) quoting in turn Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
"29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a) (1985).
" § 1604.11(a)(3) quoted in Meritor, 106 S.Ct. at 2401 (1986).
"Meritor, 106 S. Ct. at 2401.
"Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality v. St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-515 (8th Cir. 1977); Banta v.
United States 434 U.S. 819 (1977); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
"Compston v. Bordon, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
"Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977).
"Meritor, 106 S. Ct. at 2401.
Winter, 1987]
7
Marinelli: Sexual Harassment
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1987
AKRON LAW REVIEW
The Supreme Court in Meritor cited Rogers v. EEOCI2 which was the
first case that recognized a cause of action based upon a discriminatory work
environment. In Rogers, a Hispanic employee brought a Title VII suit against
her former employer, an optical company which had segregated patients by na-
tional origin.73 The Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court by finding that Title
VII protects an employee's psychological, as well as economic benefits., The
segregation of patients by national origin could violate Title VII because of the
psychological effects on the employees. The Supreme Court in the Meritor
case approvingly quoted from Rogers,
[Tihe phrase 'terms, conditions or privileges of employment' in [Title VII]
is an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the prac-
tice of creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or
racial discrimination ... One can readily envision working environments
so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emo-
tional and psychological stability of minority group workers .... 11
The court found no reason to distinguish a racially harassing environment
from a sexually harassing environment and quotes from Henson v. Dundee76
to support its position as well as citing other federal court decisions."
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for
members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at
the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a re-
quirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return
for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be as de-
meaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.78
It is important to note that in Meritor the Supreme Court quoted from
both Rogers and Henson in finding that not all "harassment" affects a "term,
condition, or privilege" of employment within the meaning of Title VII.79 "The
mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feel-
ings in an employee"8 0 would not affect the conditions of employment to a
significant degree to violate Title VII. "For sexual harassment to be ac-
tionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment."81
"454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert denied 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
"Id. at 236.
"Id. at 238.
"1454 F.2d at 238.
76682 F.2d 897 (11 th Cir. 1982).
"See Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254-255 (4th Cir. 1983) Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934-944 (D.C. Cir.
1981); Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Wisc. 1984).
78682 F.2d 981, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
11106 S. Ct. at 2401.
"
6 Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11 th Cir. 1982) quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th
Cir. 1971).
"Meritor, 106 S. Ct. at 2401.
[Vol. 20:3
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In the Meritor v. Vinson case, the plaintiff Vinson was hired by Sidney L.
Taylor, who was a vice president of the Savings and Loan. Vinson began as a
teller-trainee and successfully was promoted to teller, head teller and finally
assistant branch manager. Her supervisor was Taylor but her advancement
was achieved on merit alone. After working four years at the branch savings
and loan, she took indefinite sick leave and was discharged two months later
for excessive use of that leave.
She then brought suit against her supervisor Taylor and the Savings and
Loan alleging sexual harassment on the part of her supervisor Taylor. Vinson
testified that Taylor asked her to have sexual relations with him claiming that
she "owed him" because he had obtained the job for her. She ultimately yielded
out of what she described was fear of losing her job, and thereafter he made
repeated demands upon her for sexual favors. She estimated that over the
course of several years she had intercourse with him some 40 or 50 times, and
she even alleged that he forcibly raped her on several occasions. He stopped
these activities when she started seeing a steady boyfriend. 2
The supervisor denied Vinson's allegations and contended instead that
her accusations were in response to a business-related dispute. The district
court83 denied relief, but did not resolve the conflicting testimony about the
sexual relationship between the parties. It found instead:
If [respondent] and Taylor did engage in an intimate or sexual relationship
during the time of [respondent's] employment with [the bank], that rela-
tionship was a voluntary one having nothing to do with her continued em-
ployment at [the bank) or her advancement or promotions at that institu-
tion. 4
The court found that Vinson "was not the victim of sexual harassment and
was not the victim of sexual discrimination" while employed at the bank."
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia" reversed on a number
of grounds87 including the fact that uncertainty existed as to what the district
court meant by the relationship being "voluntary" and that if the evidence
otherwise showed that "Taylor made Vinson's toleration of sexual harassment
"For a detailed chronology of the plaintiff's allegations and contentions, see Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl.
Prac. Case 37-43 BNA (1980).
"Vinson v. Taylor, 23 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CASES, 37 BNA (1980).
4 'd. at 42 (footnote omitted).
Old. at 43.
86753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
"The reversal was based on the failure of the district court to consider whether "Vinson's grievance was
clearly of the hostile environment type." 753, F.2d at 145 with the Court of Appeals relying heavily on its
earlier opinion in Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The reversal also was based on the issue
of employer liability with the Court of Appeals holding that an employer is absolutely liable for sexual ha-
rassment practiced by supervisory personnel, whether or not the employer knew or should have known
about the misconduct, 753 F.2d at 150, while the district court ultimately concluded that "the bank was
without notice and cannot be held liable for the alleged actions by Taylor." 23 F.E.P. Cases 37, 43 (D.D.C.
1980).
Winter, 19871
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a condition of her employment" her voluntariness "had no materiality what-
soever.""8 The court surmised that the district court's finding of voluntariness
was based on "the voluminous testimony regarding respondent's dress and fan-
tasies" which the Court of Appeals believed "had no place in this litigation." 9
The Supreme Court in Meritor v. Vinson rejected the district court's test
of when sexual harassment occurs by holding that the test is not whether sex-
related conduct was "voluntary" but whether the sexual advances were "wel-
come." 9 The Supreme Court recognized that whether particular conduct is
welcome presents difficult problems of proof and turns largely on the cred-
ibility determinations committed to the trier of fact. It held that the district
court erroneously focused on the voluntariness of her participation rather than
the correct inquiry of whether it was unwelcome.9'
The Supreme Court decision in Meritor v. Vinson is consistent with Bun-
dy v. Jackson92 in that it required pattern of repeated as opposed to isolated in-
cidents. Where behavior is outrageous, it should not have to be repeated for it
to constitute actionable sexual harassment. The extreme and outrageous na-
ture of the conduct is relevant.93 The Bundy court pointed to criteria from the
ethnic harassment case of Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club ' in
making such a determination. The Supreme Court has put to rest the notion
that loss of a tangible job benefit is necessary for a sexual harassment case.
This unanimous interpretation of Title VII is consistent with cases involving
other forms of discrimination and with the EEOC Guidelines. The "unwel-
come" standard seems to eliminate the need for the plaintiff to demonstrate
resistance to the harassment and recognizes the practical difficulties on the
plaintiff in the employment context. 95
VICARIOUs LIABILITY OF THE EMPLOYER
If the plaintiff establishes that he was subjected to sexually harassing con-
duct within the employment context, it is still necessary to establish that the
employer was responsible either directly or vicariously for the conduct. If the
alleged harassment is committed by the employee's supervisor, the employee
will have a cause of action against the supervisor.9 As was noted in the early
"753 F.2d at 146.
"Id. at 146 n. 36.
9"106 S. Ct. at 2401.
91d
91641 F.2d at 943-45.
"Id. at 944.
9'568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977).
9See Bundy, 641 F.2d at 946 for the difficulties which an employee faces.
"Title VII defines an employer against whom suit may be instituted as a "person engaged in an industry af-
fecting commerce.., and any agent of such a person." 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b) (1985). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(3) (1958).
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case analysis the federal district courts were very reluctant to hold employers
liable for the alleged sexual harassment of their supervisors.97 The appellate
courts have discarded this reluctance and found that sexual harassment by
supervisory personnel is automatically imputed to the employer when the
harassment results in tangible job detriment to subordinate employees."
The EEOC Guidelines provide that an employer "is responsible for its acts
and those of its agents and supervisory employees with respect to sexual
harassment regardless of whether the specific acts complained of were
authorized or even forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether the
employer knew or should have known of their occurrence."" However
employer knowledge is a necessary element of a plaintiff's coworker harass-
ment suit. The Guidelines state: "With respect to conduct between fellow
employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the
workplace where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows
or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took im-
mediate and appropriate corrective action."'0 The plaintiff can establish that
the employer knew or should have known of the sexual harassment either
directly, by showing that she complained to the supervisor(s), or indirectly by
showing that the harassment is so pervasive that the employer had construc-
tive knowledge of its existence.' Judge MacKinnon in his concurring opinion
in Barnes v. Castle offered an analysis of why vicarious liability should be
found against an employer. 102 Judge MacKinnon's reasoning was threefold.
First, if ambiguous conduct might be violative of the statute, the employer is in
the best position to know the real cause, and to come forward with an explana-
tion. Second, the employer, not the employee, can establish prophylactic rules
which, without upsetting efficiency, could obviate the circumstances of poten-
tial discrimination. Finally, the type of conduct at issue is questionable at best,
and it is not undesirable to induce careful employers to err on the side of
avoiding possibly violative conduct. 3 Although the EEOC has adopted a strict
standard of liability in the case of supervisors the language of appellate courts
seems unsettled. The Supreme Court addressed the issue for the first time in
Meritor v. Vinson.
"See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
"
1See Horn v. Duke Homes, Inc., 755 F.2d 599, 604-606 (7th Cir. 1985); Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc., 721
F.2d 77, 80-81 (3rd Cir. 1983); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 n. 6 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11 th Cir. 1982); Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979).
See also Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 147-52 (D.C. Cir. 1985) which was overruled by the Supreme Court
in Meritor, 106 S. Ct. 2399.
"29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (e) (1985).
10aid. at § 1604.1 l(d).
'"'See, e.g., Katz 709 F.2d at 256; Henson, 682 F.2d at 905.
10561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977), revg sub noma. Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Case. 123 (D.D.C.
1974).
"Id. at 998.
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The Supreme Court in Meritor with Justice Rehnquist writing the majori-
ty opinion"' and Justice Marshall writing a concurring opinion, found that Ti-
tle VII prohibits sexual harassment. However, the concurring judges did not
want to leave the circumstances open in which the employer is responsible
under Title VII for sexual harassment. 15 The four concurring justices relied
upon the Guidelines and general Title VII law, as well as federal labor law,"' in
finding that the act of a supervisory employee or agent is imputed to the
employer. The concurring justices point out that courts "do not stop to con-
sider whether the employer otherwise had notice of the action" or even
whether the supervisor had actual authority to act as he did.0 7 The concurring
justices did not accept the Solicitor General's position that where the super-
visor merely creates a discriminatory work environment that the supervisor "is
not exercising, or threatening to exercise, actual or apparent authority to make
personnel decisions affecting the victim."'0 8 The Solicitor General conceded
that sexual harassment that affects tangible job benefits is an exercise of
authority delegated to the supervisor by the employer, and thus gives rise to
employer liability. The concurring justices found that a supervisor's abuse of
tangible job benefits or his creating a discriminatory work environment,
emanated from the authority vested in the supervisor by the employer in that it
enabled him to commit the wrong. The concurring justices found no justifica-
tion for special rules to be applied only in hostile environment cases and found
no notification requirement in the statute or the law of agency.' 9 The concur-
ring justices recognized that agency principles and the goals of Title VII would
place some limitation on the liability of employers for the acts of supervisors
where for instance the supervisor has no authority over an employee."
The majority of the court declined the parties invitation to issue a defini-
tive rule on employer liability because given the state of the record in the case
the appropriate standard for employer liability had a rather abstract quality
about it."' The record was not clear whether Taylor made any sexual ad-
vances, or whether they were unwelcome, or whether they were sufficiently
"°'Justices Burger, White, Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor joined the majority opinion. Justice Stevens wrote
a concurring opinion and Marshall wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment joined in by Brennan,
Blackman and Stevens.
'"'Meritor, 106 S. Ct. at 2403.
"'The concurring opinion cited labor law cases in support of a supervisory employee or agents acts being im-
puted to the employer. Id. citing Graves Trucking, Inc. v. NLRB, 692 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1982); NLRB v.
Kaiser Agricultural Chemical, 473 F.2d 374, 384 (5th Cir. 1973); Amalgamated Clothing Workers of
America v. NLRB, 365 F.2d 898, 909 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
1*7 106 S. Ct. at 2403. The Court cites for support Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1282 (7th
Cir. 1977); Young v. Southwestern Savings and Loan Assn., 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975); Anderson v.
Methodist Evangelical Hospital, Inc., 464 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1972).
'"Id. at 4709. Quoting the Brief for United States and EEOC as Amici Curiae 24.
1 Id.
"'0Id.
"'Id. at 4707.
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pervasive to constitute a condition of employment. The majority agreed with
the EEOC that Congress wanted courts to look to agency principles for guid-
ance. Given Congress' decision to define "employer" to include any "agent" of
an employer, manifests an intent to limit the acts for which employers are held
responsible. The Court found that the court of appeals erred in concluding that
employers are always automatically liable since the absence of notice to an
employer "does not necessarily insulate that employer from liability." The
Court rejected the bank's position that the mere existence of a grievance pro-
cedure, and a policy against discrimination, along with the failure to invoke
the procedure would preclude employer liability. The Court pointed out that
the bank's nondiscrimination policy did not address sexual harassment in par-
ticular, and did not sufficiently alert employees of their employers' interest in
correcting that form of discrimination."'
The Meritor case and prior case law make it clear that an employer should
be vicariously liable where an employee is discharged, demoted, or loses other
tangible job benefits because the supervisor who perpetrated the illegal act was
authorized to fire or demote the employee. An employer is not vicariously
liable for a co-worker's discriminatory acts unless it fails to take remedial ac-
tion against discrimination which it knew or should have known. As the four
concurring justices in Meritor discussed, even if the supervisor does not have
power to hire or fire, he does have authority to direct employees in their work
and should generally be held liable even in hostile environment cases. While
Meritor rejected strict liablity in hostile environment cases, the Court provided
little guidance other than referring to agency principles in such cases. The
Court was not prepared to provide definitive rules in such cases preferring in-
stead to examine the particular circumstances of each case and the particular
employment relationship and job.
REMEDIES UNDER TITLE VII AND OTHER POSSIBLE ACTIONS
In enacting Title VII, Congress apparently never considered the
availability of either punitive damages or compensatory damages." 3 The
legislative history indicates that it was modeled after the National Labor Rela-
tions Act."' The National Labor Relations Act does not provide for compen-
satory or punitive damages' and courts have not awarded compensatory and
punitive damages under Title VII. The remedial section of Title VII provides:
ITihe court may enjoin the... [employer] from engaging in [the] unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be ap-
"'Id. at 4708.
"'See Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
84 HARV. L. REV. 1209, 1262 (1971).
"1'29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1986). See remarks of Senator Humphrey 110 Cong. Rec. 6549 (1964). Comment
Enforcement of Fair Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 430, 432 (1965).
'B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1452 & n. 153-56 (1983).
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propriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hir-
ing of employees, with or without back pay . . ., or any other equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate . . . In any action under this sub-
chapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing ... party a
reasonable attorney's fee.. .16
Courts have provided a wide variety of relief including reinstatement with
back pay"', and awards of reasonable attorney's fees."' Courts can also issue
injunctions to prevent sexual harassment and to take steps to deal with com-
plaints." '
Victims of sexual harassment who are not protected by Title VII or who
believe the remedies are inadequate under Title VII have rooted their claims in
tort law and state law. 20 State law should be looked to because the regulations
may be more comprehensive and provide broader remedies.' One who is
wrongfully touched may sue for battery'; one reasonably put in fear of offen-
sive touching may sue for assault.' Other possible tort theories include inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress when conduct "go[es] beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and... [is] regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in
a civilized society"; 12 4 and intentional interference with contractual relation-
ships which would be appropriate where the person is a supervisor or co-
worker and persuades the employer to institute the retaliatory action.'25 In
many states there is an implied representation by the employer of fair treat-
ment and equal opportunity for all employees'26, which can result in a cause of
action for fraud and deceit. 7 Plaintiffs must consider the main barrier to tort
actions for sexual harassment against employers which may be the worker's
compensation law of the state. Clearly sexual harassment is outside the con-
templation of the worker's compensation system and discrimination cases have
been successfully brought because of intentional acts of discrimination. 2'
"642 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g), 2000e-5(k) (1986).
"'Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974); Slacl v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 1975).
"'Christiansburg Garmet Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 417 (1978); Heelan, 451 F. Supp. at 1391.
"'E.g., Bundy, 641 F.2d at 946 n. 13, 948 n. 15.
'See, e.g., Kyriazi v. Western Electric Co., 461 F. Supp. 894, (D. N.J. 1978); Continental Can Co., Inc. v.
State, 297 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 1980) This case was brought under the Minnesota Human Rights Act Minn.
Stat. Ann. §§ 363.01 to .13 (1966 and Supp 1980) and upheld for the first time a cause of action against an
employer for sexual harassment by co-employees).
"'See Comment, Sexual Harassment in the Work Place: New Rules for an Old and Dirty Game 14,
U.C.D.L. REV. 711, 725-29 (1981).
"'See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 9, 36 n. 85 (4th ed. 1971); Note, Sexual Harassment
in the Workplace: A Practitioner's Guide to Tort Actions, 10 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 879, 898-99 (1980).
"'See, e.g., Skousen v. Nidy, 367 P. 2d 248 (1962); MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 165-67.
"1'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment (d) (1977) Ihereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
2SSee Id. § 767.
"'See e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1411-1420. 15 (West Supp. 1980).
'21See RESTATEMENT. supra note 124, § 525.
"'See, e.g., Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. 468 P. 2d, 216 (1970); Magliulo v. Superior Court, 47 Cal.
App. 3rd 760 (1975).
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PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE AND DEFENSES
With the clear establishment of sexual harassment under Meritor for both
hostile environment and "economic" or "tangible" discrimination cases, sexual
harassment is a very fertile source of Title VII litigation in the future. All em-
ployers would be wise to realize the many ways to limit employer liability expo-
sure to sexual harassment claims. The employer should adopt and disseminate
a clear policy that sexual harassment is a prohibited employment practice, and
it will not be allowed. Those found guilty of violating the policy will meet with
appropriate sanctions."9 The communication should take several forms in-
cluding posting, inclusion in existing plant rules, newsletters, inclusion in the
personnel manual, as well as employee seminars, and training programs. 3 0 The
policy must include a formalized grievance procedure and good faith en-
couragement of its use to prevent sexual harassment. Immediate investiga-
tion"' and the development of appropriate sanctions is essential to prevent the
appearance of employer acquiescence. The good faith adherence to the formal
grievance procedure will often solve potentially litigious matters, and also gain
the respect and loyalty of the company's employees.
In the case of sexual harassment committed by co-workers, the EEOC
Guidelines clearly provide that "an employer may rebut apparent liability for
such acts by showing that it took immediate and appropriate corrective
action."' There is increasingly much to be said for prohibiting all supervisor
and subordinate romances even where voluntarily entered into because such a
volunteer may have an unfair advantage in job evaluations, merit increases,
and promotions over other employees not afforded this "opportunity."'3
'"At the federal level, the United States Office of Personnel Management has issued a policy statement re-
quiring that all federal agencies conform to the following mandates:
1. Issue a very strong management statement clearly defining the policy of the federal government as
the employer with regard to sexual harassment;
2. Emphasize this policy as part of a new employee organization covering the merit principles and the
code of conduct; and
3. Make employees aware of the avenues for seeking redress, and the actions that will be taken
against employees violating the policy.
See U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, Memorandum to Heads of Departments and Independent
Agencies, Subject: Policy Statement and Definition of Sexual Harassment. Washington, D.C., (Dec. 12,
1979).
10Samples of corporate policies on sexual harassment can be found in 107 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 75 App. G.
(1981).
"'See Continental Can Co. v. State, 297 N.W. 2d 241 (Minn. 1980) where the court approved of the findings
of the hearing examiner:
The hearing examiner concluded that Continental committed a second unfair employment practice after
[plaintiff] notified [the supervisorl of the grabbing incident on October 13, 1975 because Continental did not
conduct an immediate investigation into the matter and did not promptly attempt to prevent further reoc-
currences of the same conduct.
The essence of the second ... discriminatory practice lies not in the inadequacy of Continental's later
responses to the situation but instead in the fact that these responses were not timely. This failure to respond
promptly to [plaintiff'sl complaints regarding the grabbing incident 'connected' Continental to the act of sex-
ual harassment perpetrated by its employee. Id. at 250.
13229 C.F.R. § 1604.1 1(d) (1985).
"'See Note, Sexual Harassment and Title VII: The Foundationfor the Elimination of Sexual Cooperation as
an Employment Condition, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1007, 1032 (1978). 15
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Employers must be mindful that the courts have found relevant the employer's
actions, policies and programs to deal with sexual harassment. It is essential
that privacy of individuals during the investigatory process be maintained in
reaching a determination of the facts.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in its unanimous holding in Meritor has established
that both "hostile environment" as well as "economic" sexual discrimination
cases fall within the language of Title VII. The Court has established that the
"voluntariness" of the participation is not an issue but instead the issue is
whether the alleged sexual advances are "unwelcome." The Court rejected the
argument in hostile environment cases that employers are automatically liable
for sexual harassment by their supervisor, and the Court also rejected the
defense that having a grievance procedure and policy against discrimination
coupled with the victims failure to invoke the procedure insulates the employer
from liability. The language of the opinion does however, stress the impor-
tance of a specific and well drafted sexual nondiscrimination policy that is
widely disseminated and has a formal grievance procedure that is acted upon
promptly by the employer when grievances are filed. Preventive measures
taken before a charge is filed will provide important defensive and mitigating
arguments, but will also save a great deal of needless expense in litigation while
building employee loyalty.
Since the Equal Opportunity Commission started counting sexual harass-
ment cases in 1981, the reports to the Commission are up nearly fifty percent
and employees and labor unions are becoming increasingly aware of employee
rights under Title VII. 31 The EEOC Guidelines and the case law impose an ob-
vious duty on the employer to prevent sexual harassment. The question of
when the employer is liable for the acts of a supervisor in the hostile environ-
ment cases is still apparently a question of fact to be determined in each in-
stance. Prudent employers can take the necessary preventive measures and
careful employee training to establish a work environment free from sexual ha-
rassment.
" Simison & Trost, Sexual Harassment at Work Is a Cause For Growing Concern, Wall St. J., June 24,
1986, at 1, col. 6.
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